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WHY BE AN ECONOMIST?
Past recipients o f the Veblen-Commons 
Award have often begun by explaining how they 
became institutionalists, or what they foresee to 
be the future o f institutionalism. My view o f our 
future, you will see, scarcely justifies exuberant 
optimism such as: "Ipredict that the 1990s will 
be the decade o f the institutionalist. The Ameri­
can Economics Association will announce no 
later than 1999 that the annual meetings will be 
devoted to two themes: The first will be, "The 
Resurgence o f Words in Economic Analysis," 
and the second will be, "A New Commitment to 
Policy Relevance in Economic Modelling." No 
one would believe any o f this.
More seriously, I  would begin by noting that 
both how I became an institutionalist, and more 
fundamentally, why I  went into economics, has a 
good deal to do with how 1 regard our discipline 
today. As some may know I grew up in Austin 
with Clarence Ayres as my neighbor.
* Philip Klein, profesor na Pennsylvania Stale Univer­
sity, flan američke Association for Evolutionary Economics i 
dobitnik uvažene Veblen-Commons nagrade za doprinos 
razvoju institucionalne ekonomije u prosincu 1990. godine
A SEVENTEEN-YEAR-OLD TEXAN 
CONTEMPLATES A CAREER
When I initially encountered Clarence, the econo­
mist, I was very young. I listened to his lectures and 
read his new book, The Theory o f Economic Progress, 
and I was totally bedazzled. In the course of enlighte­
ning us on the technological continuum, Clarence 
managed in virtually any typical rhetorical sweep to 
move from, say, Alley Oop's hammer to Mozart to 
Picasso to Dr. Kinsey. I acquired the, I now realize, 
distinctly odd notion that all these were part and parcel 
of any normal lecture in economics. Of course I was 
fascinated. I was at the time living with my aunt and 
uncle, longtime friends of Ayres. Clarence's class met 
at eleven and they picked me up to take me home for 
lunch at twelve. On the way home I would recapitulate 
the day's lecture and my aunt, particularly, would work 
hard at trying to understand the distinction between the 
technological and the institutional. I also discoursed on 
the instrumental theory of value, placing it, as I recall, 
second in importance only to the Law of Gravity. She 
was awed but unconvinced, and I felt that my 
explanations must be hopelessly inadequate.
Not too long thereafter, I found myself at Berkeley 
entering their Ph.D. program. This transfer was not 
unlike a lifelong Unitarian entering a Druid Monastery. 
Marginal utility, indifference curves, and ceteris pari­
bus assumptions were in. Alley Oop, Mozart, Picasso, 
and Dr. Kinsey were all gone. I was miserable. I took 
to crossing Berkeley-s broadest streets as slowly as 
possible and hoping for the worst which at the time 
struck me as best. There were days when I hated 
Clarence for persuading me I was interested in econo­
mics when what, my early Berkeley ruminations sug­
gested ominously to me, I was obviously interested in 
wasn't economics so much as Clarence. What had I 
gotten myself into?
What indeed? Later reflection persuaded me that 
it was pragmatic concern for the world about me 
combined with an urge to do something about it that led 
me to economics. It was then that I saw clearly that 
beyond Clarence, the classroom spellbinder, was a 
man whose interests, concern for value questions, and 
approach to economics were almost totally consonant 
with the mind set with which I initially approached 
economics. I assumed from the start that economics 
was an important-even vital-field. My approach was an
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intuitive reaction to a childhood in Austin as much as 
anything else. Growing up in that very segregated 
Texas town, topped off by an undergraduate education 
which led me in English to read The Grapes o f Wrath, 
in Sociology to read Myrdal-s An American Dilemma, 
and in economics to read Veblen, Berle and Means, and 
Keynes led me to a perspective which I confess I hold 
to this day.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS-IMPROVING A 
FLAWED SYSTEM
I grew up convinced that poverty even in the 
United States was a problem of immense proportions 
and that it was closely tied to bothracism and classism.
Myrdal-s American Dilemma1 especially spoke 
directly to me and to my early Texas experiences. I 
absorbed, perhaps without realizing it, the realization 
that virtually all the Blacks one encountered were poor. 
While there was a lot of white poverty in the South it 
was better insulated from the academic cocoon than 
black poverty. If there were any affluent Blacks they 
were never visible to me.
I did not then associate Myrdal with institutional­
ism, though twenty years later he was widely recog­
nized as the leading European institutionalist. An 
American Dilemma bristles with analyses of economic 
problems, but on looking at the work now two factors 
strike me immediately. One is that he makes little or no 
effort to separate the narrowly economic from other 
aspects of the societal challenge which race relations in 
the United States represented.
The second factor is that concern with societal 
values suffuses the work. This is no depiction of a 
system operating automatically to produce results which 
should be accepted, let alone regarded as ideal, because 
of the way in which they were generated.
Myrdal I now realize was reinforcing my 
institutionalistperspective. From the start I never bought 
into the view that any part of the economy, most 
particularly the market, generated consequences which 
should be accepted uncritically. I never believed, the­
refore, in the economy as a normatively neutral vessel, 
producing any results, allocative or otherwise, which 
were anything more than grist for the mill of societal 
review, which-then as now-seemed to me to be the 
critical factor.
Here we come to the heart of institutionalism. The 
market is no more nor less miraculous than many other 1
1 Gunnar Myrdal, AmericanDilemma, New York, HarperBros.,
1944.
converyor belts. It may work in extremely efficient 
fashion, it may be fast, it may be ruthless, it may be 
unflagging, but always we must ask, is it conveying 
what we wish conveyed and who is it hurting along the 
way?
An American Dilemma is a long painful depiction 
of the enormous value gap between American Ideals 
(Myrdal calls it the American Creed) and the way in 
fact that American society circa the 1940s was opera­
ting. It is a dissection of a flawed system and a flawed 
process, described in scholarly and excruciating detail 
by a man who nevertheless was, at the end of his study, 
highly optimistic about the possibilities for making the 
kind of progress which haltingly we began to make, 
through the civil rights legislation of the 1960s and in 
other ways, in the years following Myrdal-s asses­
sment.
As economic analysis the work is far more quan­
titative than quantitative though there are statistics on 
the impact of racism on the division of income, con­
sumption, production, and employment. At the end, it 
is Myrdal-s viewof the unequal division of both oppor­
tunity and hop» which impresses. It is a powerful 
antidote to current economists- obsession with quanti­
tative analysis and a strong imp»tus to the revalidation 
of diverse methodologies. Myrdal-s depiction of the 
sick symbiosis between racism and poverty and the 
impact of this on the national psyche stays with one far 
longer than any mere statistic could.
My reasons for wanting to be an economist were, 
therefore, fundamentally normative. They were 
institutionalist, and many today would no doubt say 
they were naive. I thought as a discipline economics 
was to be used for the puiposes which Myrdal sug­
gested. I took seriously Veblen-s contention that it had 
something to do with “enhancing the life process.” 
Alleviating pxjverty, I thought, would be a giant aid in 
alleviating racism. I presumed that widespread poverty 
as well as the skewing of health care, education, trai­
ning, and opportunity in favor of whites were all 
reflections of an economy operating poorly; at the very 
least paying a high price in foregone output, a narrow 
calculus presumably acceptable even to positive eco­
nomists, for indulging in behavior which on ethical 
grounds could be regarded as reprehensible.
Mainly Myrdal viewed Americans as p>eople made 
profoundly uncomfortable by the gap between national 
ideals and actual economic pjerformance even while 
they had enormous difficulties in altering any part of 
the system-including their own attitudes-which pro­
duced the disparities and the conflicts.
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Into this world of young Phil Klein-s thinking 
about economic problems came Keynes- GeneralTke- 
ory2 Like Myrdal, Keynes was notpresenting apristine 
and perfect system for our admiration. Rather he was 
looking at the obviously flawed system around him and 
asking why it was operating so poorly. His goal, as 
every sophomore economics student of the 1940s must 
have learned, was to save the system. In the mid-forties 
came the Beveridge Report in the United Kingdom, 
suggesting that in addition to Keynes- concern about 
the role of govement in maintaining full employment 
one could legitimately assign govemment-in what he 
termed “a free society” —  responsibility for guarante­
eing to all the minimal provisioning for a variety of 
basic needs including retirement, sickness, accident, 
widowhood, guardianship for minors, temporary 
unemployment, maternity, and funerals.3 When, after 
the Second World War we passed the Full Employment 
Act of 1946 Iregarded it as our start toward Beveridge-s 
freee society and as of a piece withMyrdal-s American 
Creed.4
In my youth, therefore, I believed that economics 
was critically involved with what Dewey would have 
termed meaningful “ends in view.”5 Under the impetus 
of a dynamic technology via the means-ends continu­
um, people produce and reproduce, always for their 
own time, a “strategy of progress” — both economic 
and societal, although “the triumph of imbecile 
institutions”, to recall Veblen-s telling phrase, can 
slow us down for long periods of time.
I was drawn to economics, in short, because I was 
angry at the racism all around me; I was anguished by 
the poverty I saw. I thought the discipline of economics 
offered a way to tackle the critical link between the two 
and so enable a social scientist to exercise compassion. 
The work to be done in confronting society-s most
2John Maynard Keynes, TheGeneralTheory o f Unemployment, 
Interest, andM oney, New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1936.
3 Cf. William F. Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society, 
G. Allen Unwin Ltd., 3rd Edition, 1945.
4 Edwin G. Nourse, first Chairman o f the Council of Economic 
Advisors called the Full Employment Act of 1946 an effort “...to have 
economic scientist, economic engineer, and economic politician teamed 
in conscientious joint enterprise to find ways by which we can live and 
work together most harmoniously and most productively in free asso­
ciation. “Edwin G. Nourse, Economics in the Public Service, New 
York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953. p. 28. As I hope will 
become clear in the text it is my judgment that in recent years the 
economic scientist-that is, the theorist, has, explicitly left the team.
5 The phrase, basic to the instrumental theory of value, is
Dewey-s. Cf. Theory o f  Valuation, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1939. Cf. also the discussion in Marc Tool, The Discretionary 
Economy, Santa Monica, California, Goodyear Publishing Company, 
Inc., 1979., p. 283.
compelling challenges seemed to those of us struggling 
in Texas in the 1940s to require studying political 
economy to discover why U. S. economic performance 
was so flawed.
Yes, undoubtedly much good work in applied 
economics is done today by all sorts of economists 
studying economic problems both in andoutof govern­
ment. But what is the contribution being made to 
economic progress by the heart of the discipline-its 
theory? Economic theory need I remind you is the 
source of much of the discipline-s pride. It is surely the 
justification for labelling itself the Queen of the Social 
Sciences.
A question I ask, therefore, in all seriousness, is 
whether or not in economics the profession thinks one 
can be scholarly or dispassionately analytical and also 
exhibit anguish, compassion, or anger? It is still fashio­
nable to regard “positive economics” as objective- 
therefore scholarly —  and “normative economics” as 
suspect because it “lacks objectivity”. Institutionalists 
have never bought this, but I charge that economists 
today who exult in “equilibrium” and urge “the freeing 
of markets” almost never look at the actual operation of 
the economy we in facthave. Forty-six years ago Ayres 
wrote “Physics no longer hymns the ‘natural harmonies- 
of the universe; but economics does.”6 Today, I ask, 
“What kind of allocation system is consonant with our 
theorists- “equilibrium?”
A PRAGMATIC VIEW OF THE U. S.
ECONOMY
Almost any set of current U. S. social indicators 
will shed light on this question. Among 25 countries 
studied by the OECD more than half the countries have 
more doctors per 1000 inhabitants than the U. S. And 
only five countries have higher infant mortality rates. 
It is perhaps not surprising that Portugal and Yugosla­
via have higher rates, but it ought to raise basic ques­
tions about our system that Finland, Iceland, and Spain 
— to take but threee cases —  have much lower rates.7 
Infant mortality rates tell much about basic national 
priorities. The link between poverty and race, confirm­
ing Myrdal-s view yet again, is here clearly revealed. 
In 1986, the last year available for such comparisons, 
the U. S. white infant mortality rate based on deaths in 
the first year for every 1,000 live births was 8.9%, for 
Blacks it was 18%. Of thirty-five countries studied by
6 Clarence E. Ayres, The Theory of Economic Progress, Chapel 
Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1944, p. 66.
7 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1990, Basic Statistics: Intrana­
tional Comparisons.
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the Department of Health and Human Services only 
Hungary and Chile had rates higher than 18%. T wenty- 
one had lower rates than the average for all Ameri­
cans.®
Shall we contemplate education, which even to 
the most normative-eschewing mainstream economist 
ought to suggest increasing the potential productivity 
of young human inputs? 1983 produced the report, “A 
Nation at Risk” in which the National Commission on 
Excellence in Education suggested that the U. S. edu­
cational system by any number of criteria was woefully 
inadequate.8 9 There is little dispute that we have an 
educational system far below what our resources would 
permit, less successful than that in many other indus­
trial countries, and deteriorating especially in the past 
ten years.
It has been reported that only one-fifth of the 
eligible children ever got enrolled in Head Start pro­
grams. It may matter tragically less than we might 
think. After 25 years experience with Head Start a 
recent study concluded “that a one year program, with 
little follow-up once children reach school, cannot 
combat the ill effects of poverty.”10 The 1980s saw U. 
S. teen-age pregnancies rise to one million a year, well 
above the level in most other industrialized countries, 
and 375,000 babies being bom annually with drugs in 
their systems.11
What all this means, I conclude, is that improving 
the educational system, difficult as it might be in 
affluent areas, is a virtually intractable problem among 
the poor.
This is not all. From 1973 to 1987, the income 
share of the top fifth increased from 41.1% to 43.7% 
and even more disturbing, the share of the lowest fifth 
declined from 5.5% to 4.5%12 Thus during the recent 
expansion (our longest peacetime expansion) the per­
centage living in poverty far from decreasing actually 
increased. Worse still, a related study found that in the 
twenty years ending in 1987 the percentage of U. S. 
children living in poverty increased from 17.6% to 
20.6%. The United States, in sum, has the highest child 
poverty rate of any country in the industrialized world.13 
But our markets, presumably, clear.
8 New York Times, Aug 6,1990, p. B1 1.
9 New York Times, D. 20,1989, B 9.
lOAfcw York Times, Feb. 14,1989, A 1:2.
11 Cf. New York Times, Dec. 20,1989, B p. 9 op. cit. and New 
York Times, Jan. 9,1990.
12Leonard Silk reporting on a study by Sheldon Danziger, Peter 
Gottschalk, and Eugene Smolensky in the May 1989 Proceedings of 
theAm .Econ. Assoc. See New York Times, May 12, 1989, D 2 ,l.
13 NYT. op. cit.
All this suggests that poverty in the U. S. is not 
only still linked very much to race, but those in poverty, 
white and black, fare less well in the U. S. than they do 
in many far poorer countries, with different allocation 
systems. Poorer countries appear to have better health 
care systems and better educational systems than are 
found in the U. S. In sum, many participants in the 
economy we in fact have, fare appallingly badly. Must 
a “ good” economist remain impassive when confronted 
with all this information? I ask such questions not 
because all economists ought by rights to be working 
on these problems. I ask them because they are ger­
mane to a question rarely asked in economics: what is 
the function of economic theory?
ECONOMIC THEORY-RATIONALIZING 
THE STATUS QUO
As a profession and as a discipline contemplating 
its underlying theoiy I would argue that economists 
remain curiously unmoved by evidence of economic 
failure. “Positive” economic analysis can seemingly 
focus on “the miracle of the free market” 
notwithstanding all the indicators of failure. “The 
social safety net” may have huge holes in it, but the 
gigantic rationalizing machine that is modem econo­
mic theory (both micro —  and macro) chums out ever 
more ingenious excuses for not intervening. Unem­
ployment is “natural”; the business cycle is an “equili­
brium process”; economic agents are “rational” and so 
discount any effort to intervene except for surprises or 
shocks. There is no need to worry about lack of com­
petition in markets if entry is conceivable — that is, if 
markets are “contestable.” Regulations destroy the 
incentives of the entrepreneurs — as do taxes. Trade 
unions weaken and possibly destroy the system by 
making wages less flexible —  therefore exacerbating 
inflationary pressures (a charge which, curiously, is 
not levelled at the impact of corporate profits on 
prices).14
Mainstream theorists appear to operate on the as­
sumption that “freeing the market” is the main concern 
to which they must pay attention. The problems previ­
ously alluded to are either ephemeral — part of the 
equilibrating process — or “social” and so not within 
their purvue. But an economy that is constantly re­
ferred to by economists as a “miracle” to be emulated 
by all other countries is being caricatured when a
14 Gardiner Mean-s balanced concern for “administered prices”, 
by which he meant “cost-push inflation,” has long since been replaced 
by one-sided “wage-push inflation.” Cf. Gardiner C. Means, ‘The 
Reality of Administered Prices,” in The Corporate Revolution in 
America, Crowell-Collier Press, New Yoik, 1962, pp. 77-96.
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“positive” allocation theory can ignore all these human 
catastrophes and insist that government must not inter­
vene or dampen investor incentives in market-clearing.
If the government has been involved and there is 
failure, mainstream economists, as we have seen, fre­
quently charge regulatory failure. If all else fails one 
can charge that government officials are corrupt or 
corruptible and so cannot be trusted to monitor the 
system even if monitoring were otherwise a good idea.
If there has been no effort at government regula­
tion then the failures are either “natural” or the conse­
quences of not waiting long enough for “market forces” 
to work. How long is long enough?
In the post-war period enduring recession and 
high unemployment to rid ourselves of inflation even 
temporarily have been widely regarded as unfortunate 
but necessary. I studied the use of recession as a 
technique for eliminating inflation in eight industriali­
zed countries in the period roughly from the early 
1950s to the mid 1980s. These eight countries exhibi­
ted a total of forty nine recessions. In more than a 
quarter of the casses the recession did not succeed in 
bringing the inflation rate down at all. For the rest, the 
average length of time inflation stayed down was 
eleven months —  scarcely a stunning victory — and in 
about one fifth of the cases the inflation rates were 
rising even before recession ended.'5
Nonetheless, cyclical unemployment is the price, 
we are told, we have to pay for other goals; non-infla- 
tionary goods and factor market clearing is the princi­
pal result sought.
In the pursuit of “natural” labor market clearing, 
we can endure high unemployment indefinitely (twelve 
years in the Great Depression). We can observe any 
necessary percentage of the population falling into 
poverty. We can tolerate any number of “discouraged 
workers” who stop looking for a job and so, by making 
the labor force smaller actually make the unemploy­
ment rate go down. Disequilibrium in employment is in 
any case a lesser order of problem than price disequili- 
bria, and can be interpreted for as long a time as is 
necessary as a possibly unfortunate but necessary part 
of the equilibrating process requiring time and pa­
tience, therefore, but not intervention.
More generally, mainstream theorists have little 
to say about those who have been so mangled by the 
society we have created that through deprivations at 15*
15 Philip A. Klein, “What-s Natural About Unemployment?,”
in P. A. Klein, Editor, Analyzing Modern Business Cycles, Armonk, 
New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990, pp. 293-301.
home, discrimination, lack of education or educational 
opportunity, unacceptable health care, inadequate mo­
tivation, etc, they never get the chance to become the 
productive inputs they could have been.
In sum, mainstream theorists are a proud and busy 
lot. They mostly rationalize failures, suggest the futili­
ty of trying to improve performance, or occupy 
themselves with other matters —  spinning out multi­
variate models which presumably find their justifica­
tion in either the challenges to logic they surmount, or 
the awesome if unreal world they depict. It is not too 
strong a statement to suggest that today both micro and 
macro economic theory is proud of its internal logic 
and elegant precision. But it is not overly concerned 
with seeking explanations which will enable us to 
relieve any of the problems we have been discussing or 
to make the economy perform better.
CONFRONTING ECONOMIC FAILURE
Little attention, we have noted, is paid to the im­
plications of all this for the theorists- perspective 
toward economic failures. We have seen that what it 
pleases us to call the social safety net is replete with 
very large holes. The social work profession may strive 
to improve the situation, but economists largely look 
the other way. There is a great deal of talk in this 
country about “the disadvantaged,” although we have 
charged that relatively little of it comes from econo­
mists, and certainly not from economic theorists. The 
thrust of much mainstream theory must be that people 
are “voluntarily disadvantaged.”
“New classical” theorists conclude that much un­
employment is “voluntary.” Consistency requires that 
they go one step further. Along with voluntary unem­
ployment, they clearly need to confront voluntary 
homelessness, voluntary starvation, voluntary high 
infant mortality, voluntary poor health, voluntary pre­
mature death, voluntary slums, voluntary lack of edu­
cation or training, voluntary exposure to criminal as­
sault, and voluntary human inadequacy and failure. If, 
given enough time, the market corrects all disequili- 
bria, which would be the rubric under which all these 
conditions — were they involuntary —  would fall, it 
must follow that “market failure” is not a viable general 
explanation to call upon for any of these assorted 
misfortunes because then significant government ac­
tion might be required. The essential article of faith is 
that the legitimate sphere for government is modest. 
These conditions generally, therefore, must presuma­
bly be passed off as part of a market-clearing process 
which just happens to be a wee bit slow.
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At the very least economists should be concerned 
about the opportunity cost to society of having “disad­
vantaged” people. How much GNP is thereby fore­
gone; how much growth?
PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES — 
ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL
All economists acknowledge that the rate at which 
the production possibility frontier is pushed outward 
depends critically on the rate of technological develop­
ment; and that the institutionally sanctioned produc­
tion possibility frontier is always well within the tech­
nological frontier. Economists profess, therefore, to 
being cognizant of the output and growth foregone via 
institutional restrictions on technologically possible 
production. By the conventional efficiency standards 
of the discipline, the greater the resources the more 
lamentable ought we to regard the gap between actual 
and potential production. Therefore, poverty in the 
United States is a far greater economic scandal than in 
—  say —  Bangladesh. Few would deny that the U. S. 
has a crumbling infrastructure, a deteriorating educa­
tional system and adangerous concentration of poverty 
and lawlessness in our great cities.16 And we must still 
acknowledge massive discrimination. Nonetheless, all 
these are presumably consonant with “equilibrium.”
Ayres was right. In appraising economic perfor­
mance equilibrium is the least of it. The relative 
insensitivity on the part of economic theorists to eco­
nomic failure —  by which I mean failure to train and 
utilize human resources in the ways which the econo­
mic logic of optimizing productivity ought to com­
mend, seems indisputable. The lure of sanitized mo­
dels, elegant in their carefully controlled multivariate 
unreality, is, we have seen, seemingly irresistible.
Why is this? I would argue it is partly because eco­
nomic failure is difficult to quantify. Myrdal was 
untroubled by this. Today with the possible exception 
of Gary Becker-s work, the difficulty in quantifying 
discrimination, renders it and its attendantconsequences 
problems economists are loath to tackle. Despair, dis­
couragement, and resignation can-t be modelled. If I 
appear discouraged about our discipline it is because 
the charge I am levelling — that mainstream theory 
sacrifices relevance for rigor— is far from new. But far 
from impressing our colleagues, they have in the years 
since the charge was first levelled gone for ever more 
rigor at the cost of more and more relevance. The 
advent of the computer has merely aggravated the
16 Cf. for example, Henry Kaufman, New York Times, 9/23/90,
p. 13.
trend. Now rather than attempting to include fewer 
restrictive assumptions so that the results might con­
ceivably have greaterrelevance, the movement is in the 
other direction.
So while game theorists can tell us with great 
elegance what will happen to resource allocation be­
tween two people and two goods under a variety of sets 
of imaginatively restrictive assumptions, hardly any 
one worries about the real people in the real economy 
who end up with no goods.
THE ASYMMETRY OF MAINSTREAM 
VIEWS OF MOTIVATION
One of the implications of what we say is that there 
is much hypocrisy in the protestations of orthodox 
theorists that “free market solutions” are invariably the 
ones which further the life process most significantly.
Much of the conservative rhetoric of the past 
decade or more has suggested that entrepreneurial 
motivation, for Schumpeter the major locomotive for 
converting technological progress into a more efficient 
economy, is today very fragile.17 *
How else explain the continued insistence that 
corporate taxes are a major culprit behind flagging pro­
ductivity in American enterprise? Today the reduction 
in the capital gains tax is widely advocated as a major 
way to “restore incentive” to the system. Incentive, of 
course, is for entrepreneurs to produce.
One hears virtually nothing about declines in 
incentive perhaps extant elsewhere in the economy. 
Some possibilities: discouraged workers may have lost 
the incentive to go out and look for a job. Unskilled 
workers may have little incentive to seek new skills and 
new training. Students may have inadequate incentive 
to stay in school or to apply themselves. Like entrepre­
neurial incentives, programs to bolster all these and 
other incentives can be imagined (e. g., Scholanships, 
job training programs, etc.). Such programs “require 
money” and that means taxes, definitionally bad. A 
reduced capital gains tax also costs money, but because 
it affects entrepreneurs rather than any other factor of
17 Schumpeter would say that “competitive capitalism had
turned into “trustified capitalism”, the latter being ruled by inertia more 
than the quest for profits. It is essentially this explanation which causes 
Schumpeter to conclude that capitalism would not survive. It was “too 
successful.” C f  Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1942,1947. The terms 
“Competitive” and “trustified” capitalism were introduced by Schumpe­
ter in his article, “The Analysis of Economic Change,” Review o f  
Economics andStatisticst X V II, No. 4, May 193S, pp. 2-10. Reprinted 
in John J. Clark and Morris Cohen, Editors, Business Fluctuations, 
Growth, andStabilization, New York, Random, House, 1963, pp. 465- 
59, p. 53.
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production it escapes the free market rhetoric and the 
chaarge that it will cost money that would have to be 
made up someplace else.
As between encouraging workers so as to increase 
consumption and encouraging entrepreneurs so that 
there are goods to buy we have the classic economic 
debate about whether growth is best stimulated on the 
supply or the demand side. Keynes was right here as 
frequently —  we should “advance on both fronts at 
once.”18 Whether producers produce to meet demand, 
or consumers demand because they have been hired to 
produce and so have income is an absolutely futile 
debate.
In sum the current emphasis on “freeing the mar­
ket” is disingenuous at best. Entrepreneurs- fragile 
incentives need bolstering; trade unions are an impedi­
ment to the execution of the entrepreneurial function. 
Governmental intrusion into the operation of the “free 
market” is, therefore, asymmetrical. Bailing out Lock­
heed or Chrysler is O.K. A government plan, regard­
less of the cost, to save bankrupt Savings and Loan 
Companies is “in the public interest.” But programs 
which focus on making labor more productive, or 
freeing workers from concern about the stability and 
security of their lives, improving their education or 
health care system etc. are definitionally declared 
“fiscally irresponsible”. They interfere with the opera­
tion of the market. Clearly some factors are to be left 
more free as well as better equipped to cope than 
others.19
The task of economic theory is not to free the 
market. For institutionalists, the task is, in light of 
ongoing technology, resources, and evolving societal 
values, to offer expert advice and guidance on how best 
to enhance the lives of all the participants in that 
economy. Said Keynes, “It may well be that the classi­
cal theory represents the way in which we should like 
our economy to behave. But to assume that it actually 
does so is to assume our difficulties away.”20 As I long 
ago remarked, theeconomist-s “propensity to assume” 
has been growing —  not diminishing — ever since.21
No central plan, however bureaucratic and bung­
ling, could treat participants with greater insensitivity
18John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory o f  Employment, 
lnleresl.andMoney, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936.,
p.325.
19Fora fuller discussion of this point seeP. A. Klein, “Changing 
Perspectives on the Factors of Production,” JEI, 22,3 September 1988, 
795-809.
20 J. M. Keynes, op. ci'l., p. 34.
21 P. A. Klein, “Demand Theory and the Economist s Propen­
sity To Assume,” JEI, 6/73.
than a “free market” not monitored in its operation by 
the assumedly compassionate society in which it ope­
rates. This central institutionalist tenet is what, at the 
end of the day, separates us from other schools of 
thought.
The institutionalist perspective of economics as a 
normative science involved in the ongoing societal 
task of defining progress was Myrdal-s point of depar­
ture. It is the point where this discussion began. The 
appropriateness of this perspective is, in my judgment, 
revalidated every single day.
CONCLUSION
The situation described can be summarized. Our 
micro-theorists today assure us that, left to their own 
devices “markets clear.” Anti-trust, regulation and 
other types of intervention are regarded mostly as 
counter-productive interferences with market forces, 
and so are definitionally bad. Our macro theorists 
meanwhile tell us that the glitches we observe in 
macroperformance are part of a natural equilibrating 
process. Whether “real” or “equilibrium,” business 
cycles do not require intervention. The major thrust of 
mainstream theory, therefore, is that the economy is 
functioning smoothly or if not, no intervention could 
improve its performance. The elegance, sophistica­
tion, and precision with which these conclusions are 
reached is a source of never ending professional pride.
But in the face of all this micro and macro equilib­
rium we see that the division of the economic pie is 
getting more, not less unequal. Even more importantly, 
the condition of the have-nots in the U. S. economy is 
not only worsening, but has long been and continues to 
be worse by many measures than is the case for many 
o ther countries with far fewer resources (both absolute 
and per capita) than is the case for the U. S. Finally, lest 
we become professionally concerned about this state of 
affairs, we institutionalists are told to remember that 
economics is a positive science.
Clarence Ayres was right in 1944 when he decla­
red that economists cannot rid themselves of the notion 
that “equilibrium is good.”22The common view, more­
over, is that our system is performing so spectacularly 
that it should be exported to the entire world. This view 
is widely held in spite of the gap we have noted between 
the technologically possible and institutionally sanc­
tioned output, which arguably is the largest in the indu­
strialized world. There is mounting evidence which 
should concern us: the increasing failure of the eco-
22 C. E. Ayres, op. c i t p. 66.
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nomy to provide satisfactorily for those at the bottom; 
the growing percentage of those living in poverty, the 
ongoing failure to marshal our abundant resources so 
as to begin even remotely to enable all human inputs to 
be trained so as to produce to their potential; and the 
continuing evidence that the presumed basic source of 
progress in our mixed capitalist system — entrepre­
neurial initiative —  has become extremely fragile.
Economists ought to be expert in suggesting the 
benefits in terms both of enganced output and en­
hanced quality of life, of eliminating the sources of 
lowered productivity which happen also to raise social, 
ethical, and philosophical challenges. Economists need 
to confront professionally the output implications of 
societal discrimination. Ignoring the perpetuation and 
even increase in the dooming of some — often before 
birth —  by virtue of race, sex, ethnicity, sexual orien­
tation, or class to a life of unfulfillment or poverty has 
profound economic implications. How to confront the 
societal consequences of being raised in an environ­
ment which stimulates little but futility, aggression, 
anger, inertia, mental and physical illness, crime, 
addictions, or ultimately endless dependency on soci­
ety is very much a part of the challenge to responsible 
economic analysis.
Professional concern about these matters is not a 
case of the economist poaching on the territory of 
others. The best that participants in economic activity 
can do is respond to the signals, price and otherwise, 
given off by the economy including (but not limited to) 
the market. Political scientists know that how ques­
tions are framed affects political decision making. 
Similarly participans in economic activity cannot re­
spond to signals that are not presented — they can 
chose only among the possibilities which the system 
offers them. The market system does not exhibit all 
possible choices via neutrally transmitted price sig­
nals. Monitoring the signals eliciting choice, whether 
price or non-price, is an ongoing responsibility of any 
economy that aspires to efficiency, equity, stability, 
freedom, and humaneness. Such monitoring deter­
mines the scope of the public sector by setting the 
parameters which determine its roles as referee of the 
private sector and provisioner of last resort.
Institutionalists regard theory as a never ending 
challenge to derive from the flawed performance of the 
ongoing system useful guidelines as to how its per­
formance can be brought more closely in line with 
evolving societal values. There are no rationalizations 
for failure or endless patience with success which 
arrives only in some very long run.
“Equilibrium” as an ultimate state in a system 
which nonetheless tolerates gross human misery, 
definable by even the most superficial application of 
current values, cannot be regarded either as an efficient 
or sufficient outcome of theoretical analysis. This must 
most particularly be the case for a mainstream theory 
which sets such great store on the notion of efficiency, 
when it is applied to a country like the U . S. More than 
any nation on the globe the U. S. is replete with the 
resources to reduce or eradicate human misery by 
unleashing the vast productive potential of its resour­
ces, human and non-human, freed from the constraints 
of the racism and sexism, which have always driven an 
enormous wedge between our actual and our potential 
output, so wiewed our system is not a successful 
system nor even a satisfactory system, let alone a 
miraculous system.
What has just been said is most particularly a 
statement about the economic performance our of an 
economic system, NOT a judgement about society 
from the vantage point of some other social science 
from which the pristinely pure economist can safely 
distance him or herself. Only recognition that current 
economic performance is far less than ideal and far 
removed from what our resources and technology 
would permitprovides abasis for improving economic 
theory and performance. This means offering realistic 
options to a society attempting to deploy all its re­
sources in optimal fashion in support of its strategy for 
progress. Absent this crucial recognition, no amountof 
sophisticated assumedly value-free “positivist” analy­
sis will lead to a pragmatic economic theory likely to 
ameliorate any of the flaws we have been discussing. It 
will only enable economic theorists to offer yet one or 
several more variants — albeit oftentimes brilliantly 
clever variants— of the economic theory equivalent of 
Nintendo.
If the new classical economists are correct and 
interventionism cannot on the basis of current theory 
improve the performance of the economy, the obliga­
tion of responsible economists to work at improving 
theory and so improving policy is even more compel­
ling, particularly in view of the enormous departures 
from optimal production and distribution discussed 
here.
Psychiatrists don-t assume away their patients- 
symptoms; they work at helping them disappear. Base­
ball managers don-t assume all their players either bat 
1000 or are lazy; they search for techiques to improve 
their hitting. Policemen don-t assume the streets are 
safe; they contemplate ways to increase their safety.
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Generals don-t assume the enemy will surrender: they 
try to devise winning strategies. Orthopedists don-t 
assume broken bones are non-existent or will set and 
heal themselves, they intervene. Intensive care units 
are not set up to teach patients the virtue of patience. In 
no other field do its practitioners almost invariably as­
sume that performance is either flawless, can correct 
itself, or is beyond help. But these are the alternatives 
on which mainstream theorists dote. Is it not time — at 
last— for the Queen of the Social Sciences to join other 
fields of human endeavor? Is it not time — finally — 
for economic theorists to look at the world around 
them, and ask themselves, in all humility, “How can we 
help?”
The challenge to be involved in enhancing the life 
process is all that gives economics its justification. 
Progress in this quest is all that can give this discipline 
any real cause for pride. Professional pride and legiti­
mate bases for such pride appear to be inversely re­
lated.
And so I end where I began.
I was not wrong to interest myself in economics. 
But not very much of the theoretical work that I have 
seen in my professional life appears to have confronted 
the essential challenges.
I thank you again for the great honor you pay me 
today with this award.
Philip A. Klein, Ph. D . -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sažetak
U članku autor iznosi svoje recentne stavove o ekonomskoj znanosti i njezinoj kompe­
tenciji za rješavanje najvažnijih problema razvoja s aspekta razlika između osnovnog pravca 
ekonomske znanosti (mainstream) i institucionalne ekonomije (odnos ciljeva razvoja i 
društvenih vrijednosti, nezaposlenost, inflacija, siromaštvo, stabilnost, tržište vs. regulacija 
privrede...) Pri tome objašnjava utjecaj različitih ekonomskih učenja (Ayres, Myrdal, Keynes, 
Veblen, Schumpeter) koja su ga opredijelila za ekonomsku profesiju, a kasnije za pravac in­
stitucionalne ekonomije. Ekonomisti trebaju bili eksperti koji če biti senzibilni na različite 
signale iz okruženja kojima se upozorava na diskrepanciju između performance sistema i 
promjenjivosti društvenih vrijednosti, a u cilju ostvarivanja optimalnog korištenja svih 
razvojnih resursa društva.
